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I. Is the government violating the First Amendment by criminalizing protected speech 
in the enforcement of the Child Pornography Protection Act (“CPPA”)?
II. Is the CPPA unconstitutional because it fails to either promote a compelling interest 
or employ the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest?
III. Is the CPPA void for vagueness because it fails to sufficiently notify individuals of 
what conduct is prohibited?
IV. Is the language of the CPPA so overbroad that it makes unlawful expressions that are 
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In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 2001
John Ashcroft, Attorney General 
of the United Stales, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
The Free Speech Coalition, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Respondents, Free Speech Coalition, respectfully submit this brief and request that this 
Court AFFIRM the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the 




The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198 
F.3dl083 (9th Cir. 1999).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutes relevant to the disposition of this case are 18 U.S.C. sections 2252,2252A, 
2252B, and 2256.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to detennine 
the meaning and application of those words, which require interpretation to resolve judicial 
issues. As such, this Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. Pennekamp v. St. of Fla.. 
328 U.S. 331,335(1946).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, Respondent Free Speech Coalition (“Free Speech”) filed a 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California. (J. A. 1.) Free Speech alleged the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) was unconstitutional on its face since it contained vague and overbroad 
language. (J.A. 8.) The complaint fiirther alleged that the CPPA banned or unduly burdened the 
speech of the Free Speech Coalition. (J.A. 8.) Finally, Free Speech alleged that the CPPA 
unduly chills constitutionally protected speech. (J.A. 8.) Petitioner Department of Justice 
(“Petitioner”) filed an answer to the complaint on March 31,1997. (J.A. 10.)
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on May 30, 1997. (J.A. 94.) On 
August 12, 1997, the district court ruled in favor of Petitioner, holding the CPPA is content-
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neutral and not violative of the First Amendment. (J.A. 76.) In addition, the district court held 
that the CPPA is neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague, and does not constitute an 
improper prior restraint on speech. (J.A. 82-85.) The questions involving prior restraint and 
chilling of speech are no longer at issue in this case.
Free Speech filed a timely notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 87.) On December 17,1999, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court 
and ruled in favor of Free Speech holding the language of the CPPA to be unconstitutional. Free 
Speech Coalition v. Reno. 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
On January 31,2000, Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing 
en banc. (J.A. 109.) On July 19, 2000, the court denied the petition for rehearing and the 
petition for rehearing en banc. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 220 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 
The district court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Free Speech on August 8, 2000.
(J.A. 112.)
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed on November 16, 2000. (J.A. 114.) On January 
22, 2001, this Court granted the government’s petition for writ of certiorari. (J.A. 118.)
Statement of Facts
Free Speech is a trade association that seeks to protect its members in the exercise of their 
First Amendment rights. (J.A. 2-3.) The Free Speech mission is to assist in the defense of First 
Amendment rights against censorship. (J.A. 2-3.) Free Speech represents over six hundred 
clients involved in the production, distribution, sale, and presentation of adult-oriented, non- 
obscene materials. (J.A. 3.)
Free Speech and its members do not engage in the production, distribution, or 
presentation of child pornography. (J.A. 3.) Free Speech and its members neither advocate nor
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tolerate child pornography. (J.A. 3.) Furthermore, Free Speech and its members have actively 
sought to prevent the production and distribution of child pornography. (J.A. 3.) In fact. Free 
Speech has repeatedly denounced the production of child pornography and has acted to eradicate 
the existence of child pornography. (J.A. 3.) Free Speech has offered and awarded up to 
$10,000 in cash to any person providing information leading to the arrest and conviction of 
persons involved in the production of child pornography. (J.A. 3.)
Three members of Free Speech have also brought separate claims to the action. (J.A. 3.) 
Respondent Bold Type, Inc. publishes a book dedicated to the education and expression of the 
ideology and philosophy behind nudism. (J.A. 3.) Respondent Jim Gingerich is a well-known 
artist whose paintings include landscapes and nudes. (J.A. 3.) Respondent Ron Raffaelli is a 
well-known professional photographer, who specializes in erotic photography and who has 
published four books. (J.A. 3.) All three exhibit and sell their artwork across the United States. 
(J.A. 3.)
In September 1996, Congress enacted the CPPA. (J.A. 4.) The CPPA amends the 
definition of child pornography” to include “such visual depiction that is, or appears to be, of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” (J.A. 4.) The CPPA further amends the definition 
to include such visual depiction that is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed 
in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of 
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” (J.A. 4-5.)
The CPPA is the culmination of years of legislation aimed at prosecuting those persons 
involved in creating and distributing sexually explicit materials featuring actual minors. (J.A. 
37-38.) Recent advances in computer technology, which have made possible the production of 
“virtual child” pornography, became the Congressional target in 1996. (J.A. 30.) “Virtual child”
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pornography does not involve the use of actual minors at any point in production. (J.A. 30.) The 
CPPA was enacted with the intention of closing this “computer-generated loophole” in child 
exploitation laws and criminalizing the production of “virtual child” pornography. (J.A. 41.)
Due to the drastic changes in child pornography law resulting from the CPPA, the 
members of Free Speech claim they have been deterred from publishing and distributing their 
books and photographs. (J.A. 7.) Free Speech claims the CPPA’s harsh punishment has 
obligated its members to refrain from the creation and distribution of constitutionally protected 
forms of expression. (J.A. 3-4, 17-18.) Under the CPPA, a person producing, distributing, or 
presenting materials, which any prosecutor determines to portray images that “appear to be” a 
minor even though the images may be of adults, may be sentenced to a term of incarceration of 
ten years to life. (J.A. 4.) Further, if someone dies because of a violation of the CPPA, the 
perpetrator may be sentenced to death. (J.A. 4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the image” in section 2256(8)(B) and the 
entire section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA are unconstitutional. While some categories of speech 
have been classified as “unprotected” and outside the protection of the First Amendment, the 
contested provisions of the CPPA regulate protected speech. The provisions are an attempt by 
the government to criminalize the thoughts of private individuals.
Historically, child pornography law has been limited to the regulation of materials using 
actual children during production. Any time a child is used to create pornography, a crime is 
committed. It is in society’s best interest to prevent the production and distribution of this kind 
of material. However, the act in question criminalizes those materials that do not involve actual 
or even recognizable minors.
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The act criminalizes ideas. Ideas are protected speech. As a result, the contested sections 
of the CPPA have moved beyond the permissible regulation of child pornography as delineated 
by this Court. The sections of the CPPA that regulate “virtual” images and ideas violate the First 
Amendment.
The CPPA is a blanket suppression of an entire type of speech, and therefore, a content- 
based regulation. Content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional and only 
permissible if they pass strict scrutiny. A statute can only survive strict scrutiny if it promotes a 
compelling interest and employs the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.
The government is unable to prove a compelling state interest other than the protection of 
actual children. There is no evidence that proves the production and distribution of virtual 
images harms children. Regulating virtual imagery is not the least restrictive means to protect 
actual children. The CPPA causes private individuals to fear creatingt)therwise legal images 
containing consenting adults simply because they appear to be minors. Therefore, the provisions 
of the CPPA are not narrowly tailored to advance the state interest.
The CPPA fails to meet the requirement that a criminal statute be sufficiently definite that 
an ordinary person can understand what actions are prohibited. Instead, the CPPA’s definitions 
of child pornography (depicting sexual activity of one who “appears to be” a minor or “conveys 
the impression” that a minor was involved in its production) are imconstitutionally vague. These 
definitions fail to clearly establish what materials and conduct violate the statute, and they 
promote arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law enforcement officials in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, the affirmative defense and the 
scienter requirement, which are the Government’s proposed cures for vagueness, are not 
sufficient so as to make the statute constitutional.
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Moreover, the CPPA’s language violates the First Amendment because it is overbroad. 
The phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” broadly encompass within their scope 
expressions that are protected by the First Amendment. This overly broad language is 
unconstitutional because it chills constitutionally protected conduct and speech.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT (“CPPA”) REGULATES
PROTECTED SPEECH BY CRIMINALIZING THE USE OF FICTIONAL IMAGES
THAT ARE ENTIRELY THE PRODUCT OF THE HUMAN MIND.
The CPPA is the latest congressional enactment restricting freedom of speech. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 (1996). The premise behind the CPPA is that computer-generated depictions of minors 
engaging in sexually explicit activity pose the same threat to the well-being of children as do 
sexually explicit depictions of actual children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358 at § 4(B) (Aug. 27,1996). The 
CPPA was enacted with the intention of criminalizing these fictional images, and thus closing a 
“loophole” in child exploitation laws. Id.
In the late 1970’s, incredible media attention was given to the “discovery” of the sexual 
abuse of children. Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 928 
(2001). Society set out to destroy anything affiliated with this terrible epidemic and in the center 
of this “national emergency” sat child pornography. Id The national media considered child 
pornography a cause of the sexual abuse of children. Id In fact, the current Congressional 
attention to child pornography and pedophilia has been compared to McCarthyism and the Salem 
witch himts. Id at 924.
In the 80’s and early 90’s, the government attempted to restrict the production of child 
pornography through criminal statutes aimed at the creators, distributors, and possessors of these 
materials. E.g. Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that an Ohio statute prohibiting
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the possession of child pornography did not violate the First Amendment). This Court has 
upheld these statutes by reasoning that the creation, distribution, and possession of child 
pornography is outside the realm of First Amendment protection. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 111.
A. The Classification of Child Pornography As Unprotected Speech in Ferber Is Limited 
to Materials Produced with the Use of Actual Children.
Child pornography, which does not involve the participation of actual minors is protected 
speech. By criminalizing material consisting solely of virtual images, Congress has passed a law 
that regulates and infringes upon the First Amendment.
This Court has singled out certain categories of speech as being entirely outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. E.g. Chaplinskv v. N.H.. 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942) 
(finding “fighting words” of such slight social value that the societal benefit of their utterance is 
wholly outweighed by the interest in order and morality). Obscene speech is one such category 
that has been held outside the protection of the First Amendment by the Supreme Court. Miller 
V;_CaL» 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). A person’s thoughts and ideas, however, have always been 
protected by the Constitution. Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U S 444 HQbQV The single most 
important principle of the First Amendment is the principle of free thought - not freedom of 
thought for those who agree with us, but freedom of thought for those we hate. U.S. v. 
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
In Miller, this Court created the present standard used to determine whether speech rises 
to the level of obscenity. 413 U.S. at 69. The test is whether a work, taken in its entirety, 
appeals to the prurient interest in sex, portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and 
does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at 24. Speech is obscene, 
and therefore unprotected, only when these elements are met. Id
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Nine years later, this Court applied the First Amendment test to a child pornography 
statute for the first time in its history. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982). In Ferber> this 
Court examined the constitutionality of a New York criminal statute prohibiting persons from 
knowingly distributing material depicting sexual performances featuring children under the age 
of sixteen. ]d. at 749. In upholding the statute, this Court held that child pornography involving 
actual children was outside the scope of First Amendment protection. I^ at 764,
The effect of Ferber was to adjust the Miller test with respect to child pornography. Id. 
The “reach of the statute” was directed at the “hard core” of child pornography, suggesting that 
educational, medical, or artistic works would amount to little more than a tiny fraction of the 
materials in the statute’s scope. Id
This Court restricted the new category of unprotected speech to laws targeted at materials 
that visually depict sexual conduct by actual minors. Id at 764. Non-obscene materials 
depicting sexual conduct, which did not involve live performances or depictions of live 
performances, retained First Amendment protection. Id at 764-765. The Ferber decision was 
limited to material using actual minors during production. Id at 763. This Court further 
emphasized this limitation by suggesting that “if it was necessary for literary or artistic value, a 
person over the statutory age who ... looked younger could be utilized.” Id This Court even 
authorized the “simulation” of child pornography as a legal alternative to the use of actual 
minors. Id This Court’s requirement of knowledge of a participant’s minor status on the part of 
the defendant solidified the need for actual children within the definition of child pornography. 
Id at 765.
Unlike obscenity law, Ferber’s application of child pornography law makes no exception 
for works of “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Adler, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
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939 (quoting Miller. 413 U.S. at 24). Nevertheless, this Court emphasized that the protection of
actual children was the primary interest, which justified classifying child pornography as 
unprotected speech. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 763. Free Speech agrees that “actual child” 
pornography should be unprotected because its production necessarily includes the sexual abuse 
of a real child. Implicit in the agreement in the understanding that the Ferber rule is limited to 
materials produced with the use of actual children.
B. The CPPA Not Only Criminalizes “Actual Child” Pornography. It Criminalizes
“Virtual Child” Pornography and Therefore. Has Moved Beyond the Regulation
Permitted by This Court’s Existing Case Law.
This Court should follow the Ninth Circuit, which correctly held that the language of the
CPPA goes beyond the protection of actual minors used in production, criminalizing the use of
fictional images that are entirely the product of the mind. Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at
1092. In passing the law. Congress noted that the CPPA’s definition of child pornography
extends beyond the statute in Ferber to prohibit drawings or images that “appear to be” minors
and to visual depictions that “convey the impression” that a minor is engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 8.‘
This court strike down the contested provisions of the CPPA, finding that Congress
enacted a statute criminalizing the creation of images of fictitious children engaged in imaginary
sexual conduct. Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1095; Clay Calvert, The “Enticing Images”
Doctrine: An Emerging Principle in First Amendment Jurisprudence?. 10 Fordham Intell. Prop.,
Media & Ent L.J. 595, 596 (2000). Under the guise of a response to new technology, Congress
* The Senate Judiciary Committee was so concerned that it was overstepping its constitutional 
bounds that it included a “shadow” section to the CPPA that mirrors the section in question.
Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 8. The “shadow” section prohibits only those depictions “that have been 
created, adapted, or modified to make it appear that an identifiable minor was engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252B(a)(5)(b). Because of concern that the “appears to 
be” language would be held unconstitutional, the committee created this section to make sure 
that the questionable text was separate, distinct, and entirely severable. Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 8.
10
has outlawed materials that appear to be, but are not depictions of children engaged in sexual 
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). The CPPA has moved beyond the permissible regulation of 
child pornography delineated in Ferber. Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 
599.
This Court has limited the type of child pornography that is not protected by the First 
Amendment. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 764. Non-live visual images depicting sexual conduct 
(including computer-generated fictional images of children) receive full constitutional protection. 
Id. “Virtual child pornography, which is not obscene, is nothing more than an imaginative idea. 
However repulsive, however disgusting to majoritarian beliefs, ideas constitute protected 
speech.” Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional 
Question. 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 439,460 (1997).
The Constitution was designed to deny the government the power to control people’s 
minds. Stanley v. Ga.. 394 U.S. 557. 565 (1969). The defendant in Stanley was convicted under 
a Georgia law eriminalizing the private possession of obscene material. Id. at 558. In striking 
down the law, this Court held that the government cannot control the moral content of a person’s 
thoughts by telling private citizens what books they may read and what films they may watch.
Id. “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the though of giving government the power to 
control men’s minds.” Id
The opinion in Stanley recognized Georgia’s interest in protecting the public morality.
Id. Further, the opinion recognized the state’s argument that exposure to such material may lead 
to sexual deviance or violent crimes and that the prohibition of possession prevents subsequent 
distribution. Id. at 566-567. Nevertheless, this Court responded to the stale’s interests by 
holding that: (1) the need to protect public morals does not outweigh the personal liberties
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guaranteed by the First Amendment; (2) the inducement of antisocial conduct should be deterred 
by education and punishment for violations of the law, not by criminalizing the possession of 
printed material; and (3) restriction of protected material cannot be justified by the need to ease 
the administration of valid criminal laws. Stanley. 394 U.S. at 565, 566-567, 568.
“[The drafters of our Constitution] recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfaction of life are to be found in material things.” Id. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. U.S.. 277 
U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Pain, pleasure, and satisfaction in life mainly 
derive from the conscious ability to think. Freedom of thought is an indispensable right and the 
CPPA is a departure from this most basic principle. Congress has become so horrified by the 
crime of child pornography that it ignored warnings of this departure when passing the CPPA. 
Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 8 (in his argument in support of the CPPA Senator Biden noted that 
fifteen constitutional scholars wrote the Judiciary Committee, believing that the “appears to be” 
standard in the definition of child pornography was constitutionally suspect).
Two months after Stanley, this Court held that unless ideas are transformed into speech 
that incites imminent lawless activity, they are protected by the Constitution. Brandenburg. 395 
U.S. at 447. Brandenburg, the leader of a Ku KJux Klan group, was convicted under an Ohio 
statute for advocating the “doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Id. at 445. The evidence against 
him included videotapes of a Klan rally that were broadcast on a local Cincinnati station and on a 
national network. Id. One of the tapes showed hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms, 
standing around a large burning wooden cross. Id. During the initial broadcast, portions of the 
dialogue from the rally could be understood. Id. at 446. The transcript read in part, “[I]f our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s
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possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken... [p]ersonally, 1 believe the 
nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.” Brandenburg. 395 U.S. at 446, 
447.
The Ohio statute was unconstitutional because it criminalized subversive language by 
failing to draw a distinction between teaching of the “moral necessity for a resort to force,” and 
“steeling it to such action.” Id. (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290, 297-298 (1961)). In his 
concurring opinion. Justice Douglas wrote that a person’s beliefs are sanctuaries upon which our 
govermnent could not invade. M. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). More importantly, Douglas 
stated that legal action, undertaken because of a belief, is a method of expression within the 
protection of the first amendment. Id.
The law restricting child pornography must be scrutinized in the same way political 
dissent and subversive advocacy were in the past. Adler, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 922. First 
Amendment interests should be overridden only when material involves a direct harm to a child. 
Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 611. The test is not one of enticement 
but whether the speech creates incitement of lawless activity that would result in harm to an 
actual child. Id. The important difference between these standards is that the latter bans speech 
that advocates illegal activity while the former bans speech that merely portrays an idea. Id.
“Virtual child pornography may encourage, promote, persuade, or influence pedophiles 
to engage in illegal activity with children, it may validate their illegal activity, and it may assist 
in their illegal activity, but the conduct is neither sufficiently imminent nor compelling to 
constitute incitement.” Burke, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. at 461 (citations omitted). Child 
pornography, which does not involve the participation of actual minors, is protected speech. 
Therefore, any statute that regulates “virtual” child pornography violates the First Amendment.
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II. THE CPPA FAILS TRADITIONAL SCRUTINY ANALYSIS AND IS THEREFORE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Even when speech is protected, the government is not automatically precluded from 
regulation. Sable Commun. v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989). Still, a statute must pass some 
level of scrutiny before being deemed constitutional. M. Content-neutral statutes, those laws 
that are unrelated to the content of speech being impinged upon, are subject to an intermediate 
level of scrutiny. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc., 475 U.S. 41,47 (1986). Content- 
based regulations, which prohibit speech based on its content, are subject to a strict level of 
scrutiny. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
A. The CPPA Regulates Speech Based upon Its Content and Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny.
Every circuit court that has addressed the CPPA has found that the statute is content- 
based. U.S. V. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61.68 (Ist Cir. 1Q99L U.S. v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th 
Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2001); Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 
1091: U.S. V. Acheson. 195 F.3d 645,650 (11th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. James, 55 M.J. 297, 300 
(Armed Forces App. 2001). The unlawful character of the act is defined by the content of an 
image of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68.
The CPPA defines child pornography, in part, as any visual depiction that “is, or appears 
to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). The CPPA 
further defines child pornography to include such visual depictions that are “advertised, 
promoted, presented, described or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that 
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C). Finally, the CPPA bans child pornography, as defined, and mandates 
that those in violation of the act shall be punished. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(l). Suppression of
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this entire type of speech is by its very nature a content-discriminating act. Hilton. 167 F.3d at
68.
The CPPA fails both tests for substantive neutrality set out in Hilton, and is, therefore, 
content-based. Id. First, the CPPA expressly sets out to prevent a particular category of 
expression by singling out that type of speech based on its content and outlawing it. Id Second, 
a major motivating reason for passing the CPPA was to counter the effect this material has on 
those who observe it. W. at 68-69 (citing Sen. Rpt. 104-358 at § 4(A) (observing that a major 
threat of child pornography creates for children is the effect the material has on viewers)).
B. The Contested Sections of the CPPA Fail Strict-Scrutinv Because the Regulation of
This Protected Speech Does Not Promote a Compelling Interest Other than the
Protection of Actual Children.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that when a statute restricts speech by its content, it is 
presumptively unconstitutional. Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1091. These types of 
regulations only survive strict-scrutiny if they promote a “compelling interest” Sable Commun.. 
492 U.S. at 126, and are narrowly tailored to fulfill that interest. Boos v. Barry. 485 U.S. 312, 
321 (1988).
The government claims five distinct interests in the regulation of child pornography: (1)
child pornography uses the participation of actual minors in sexually explicit situations and
creates a permanent record of the abuse, Ferber. 458 U.S. at 759; (2) these pornographic images
encourage sexual abuse of minors because they whet the appetite of the pedophile. Sen. Rep.
104-358 at § 4(A); (3) child pornography can be used to lure or seduce children, Osborne. 495
U.S. at 111 n. 7; (4) new technology makes it difficult for prosecutors to convict under current
^ Justice Brennan dismissed the value of the “permanent record” interest in his concurring 
opinion in Ferber. 458 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring). He wrote that the harm to a child 
and the value of the depiction in question bear an inverse relationship to one another. Id. When 
the depiction is a serious contribution to art or science the assumption that a permanent record 
results in harm to a child lacks force. Id.
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law, Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 4(B); and (5) abatement of the child pornography market, Hilton. 
167 F.3dat70.
i. Harm to Actual Children Used in Production Is the Only Compelling
Government Interest That This Court Allows to Override First Amendment
Protections.
The CPPA attempts to criminalize all visual depictions that appear to be or convey the 
image that the material features minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct even when no child 
is even used or harmed in the production. Supra, at § 11(A) (noting that the CPPA goes beyond 
the established First Amendment boundaries and extends the definition of child pornography to 
materials previously held to be protected by the Constitution). This criminalizes impulses of the 
mind by regulating creative acts. Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 603. 
Censorship intended to control an evil idea cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of the 
First Amendment Id Free Speech Coalition believes that Congress has no compelling interest 
in regulating sexually explicit materials of virtual children engaged in imaginary sex.
As mentioned above, this Court has historically focused on the harm to the actual
children involved in the production of the explicit materials. Supra, at § 1(A) (authorizing the
use of adults who appear to be younger “if it was necessary for literary or artistic value” and/or
“simulation” of child pornography as a legal alternative to the use of actual minors). Applying
Ferber. the lower court held that the protection of the actual children used in the production of
child pornography was the only thing that could justify the regulation of such materials.^
To justify this expansion of the unprotected category of speech, the government must
prove a compelling interest beyond the protection of the children used in production. Calvert, 10
^ The introduction of the bill on the Senate Floor, by Senator Hatch, acknowledged that the law 
prior to 1996 covered only visual depictions of actual minors engaging in explicit conduct. 
“Today, however, visual depictions of children engaging in ... forms of sexual conduct can be 
produced entirely by computer, without using [actual] children, thereby placing such depictions 
outside the scope of Federal law.” 141 Cong. Rec. S13542 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995).
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Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 599. In attempting to identify harms other than the 
sexual abuse that results from the production of the pornography, the government will point to 
Osborne as a basis for alternative compelling interests. 495 U.S. at 111.
In Osborne, this Court was confronted with an Ohio state statute that criminalized the 
mere possession and viewing of child pornography. Id. at 106-107. In upholding the statute, 
Osborne advanced three state interests that outweighed any privacy interest associated with the 
possession of child pornography. |d, at 109-111. One of the three was the luring argument. Id,
In addressing the luring interest, this Court moved to regulate this material based on its potential 
effects for the first time in the history of child pornography law. Adler, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 
993 (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111). Not only did this Court seek to protect the children who 
had been used in production, it sought to protect those children who could become victims of 
molestation themselves. Id,
Nevertheless, the primary emphasis of the Osborne decision was the exploitation of 
children as victims in the production of pornography. Id, at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting). “At 
bottom, the Court today is so disquieted by the possible exploitation of children in the production 
of the pornography that it is willing to tolerate the imposition of criminal penalties for simple 
possession:' Id, (emphasis in original). While Osborne did raise the issue that child 
pornography can be a mechanism for crime, the luring argument was only noted in dicta. Id, at 
111. Finally, Osborne never mentioned the effect of child pornography on its adult viewers. 
Adler, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 994. Therefore, secondary interests cannot tip the balance against 
the First Amendment when materials do not use actual children in their production.
For “actual child” pornography to exist, sexual abuse of a child must have been 
committed. The compelling government interest lies in the prevention of that abuse. There is no
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such crime being committed in the production or possession of “virtual child” pornography.
Since this material presents no harm actual children, it becomes a tenuous argument to hold the 
government’s indirect interests above those of the First Amendment. A crime must be intimately 
associated vrith a specific piece of child pornography for the state to have a compelling interest 
in regulating that material.
ii. The Government Is Unable to Prove a “Causal Nexus” Betv^een the
Dissemination of Virtual Images and an Increase in Sexual Abuse of Children.
There is a belief that dissemination of child pornography encourages further sexual abuse 
because it whets the appetite of the pedophile. Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 4(A). This interest is 
based solely on the reaction of third parties to the pornographic material, li at § 11.
There is no compelling reason for allowing a third-party reaction to supersede First 
Amendment rights. Am. Booksellers Assn., Inc, v. Hudnut. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), afPd, 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986). In Hudnut. the Seventh Circuit invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting 
pornography that portrayed women in a submissive or in a degrading manner. Id. at 334. The 
government argued that the ordinance would serve to reduce the tendency of men to see women 
as sexual objects. Id. at 335. While the court accepted the reasoning that depictions of 
subordination may perpetuate subordination, it concluded that the material demonstrated the 
power of pornography as speech. Id at 329.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that all cultural stimuli provoke unconscious 
responses in all people. Id at 330. “Unconscious responses” do not outweigh the interest in 
protecting free speech. Id “If the fact that speech plays a role in a process of conditioning [was] 
enough to permit governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech.” Id
In Mento. the Fourth Circuit attempted to distinguish the Hudnut decision by reasoning 
that it does not apply to an analysis of the CPP A. Mento, 231 F.3d at 919. The Fourth Circuit
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claimed that the speech at issue in Hudnut was protected as long as it was not obscene, while the 
speech regulated by the CPPA was completely unprotected. Mento, 231 F.3d at 919. This 
analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, the material at issue in Mento was pornography 
produced with the use of actual children. |d. at 917. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the 
defendant would be guilty regardless of whether the contested sections when found 
unconstitutional. Id. Second, the Mento court willingly banned all material that it deemed to be 
child pornography. Id, at 919. In doing so, the court hastily classified all child pornography as 
unprotected and made no distinction between the nature of “actual” and “virtual” child 
pornography. Id, The Fourth Circuit interpreted the CPPA too broadly and thus, reached the 
wrong conclusion. Id,
Even if third-party responses are accepted, the government must still be able to prove a 
“causal nexus” between the dissemination of the virtual images and an increase in sexual abuse 
in order for the compelling interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Ronald W. Adelman, 
The Constitutionality of Congressional Efforts to Ban Computer-Generated Child Pornography:
A First Amendment Assessment of S. 1237,14 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 483, 488, 
490 (1996). However, factual studies that establish the link between computer-generated images 
and resulting child abuse “apparently do not yet exist.” Id,
Viewing child pornography may actually produce the opposite effect, lessening the desire 
to molest actual children. Sen. Sen. Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Jud. Comm., Hearings 
on the Effect of Pornography on Women and Children. 98th Cong. 327-343 (Oct. 30,1984). In 
1984, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice held hearings to determine the impact of 
pornography on child abuse and child molestation. Id, at 327. Testifying before the 
subcommittee was John Money, Ph.D., professor of psychology and pediatrics at Johns Hopkins
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University School of Medicine and Hospital, and founder of the Special Clinic for the Treatment 
of Sex Otfenders at Johns Hopkins. Hearings on the Effect of Pornography on Women and 
Children. 98th Cong, at 327. Not only does Dr. Money dispute the social contagion theory,'* he 
subscribes to the belief that pornography actually prevents antisocial behavior. Id.
There has never been any evidence that pornography induces sexual violence. M. at 328. 
Viewing hundreds of picture books, or dozens of films, depicting specific kinds of abnormal 
pornography, such as a bondage fantasy, or a rape fantasy, does not enable a person to “catch” 
that particular fantasy by some sort of social or pictorial contagion. Id. at 329. In a number of 
cases, viewing these types of materials has lessened the urges of criminals to act out because 
they vicariously experience their desire through the viewing of the images. Id. at 327.
The most relevant testimony appeared in a series of questions from Senator Aden 
Specter. Id at 329-330. The questions concerned the effect that a book called “How to Have 
Sex with Kids” would have on pedophiles. Id The testimony reveals that the book would have 
a negligible impact, if any, on the pedophile. Id The reason is that “a pedophile has to already 
be a pedophile ....” Id at 329. A person would not be activated or triggered simply by reading 
this type of material. Id at 330. A remarkable element of this type of condition, which is 
considered a true medical syndrome, is its extraordinary specificity. Id These conditions 
experience little deterioration, and there is little crossing of boundary lines. Id This is possible 
because there is no gray area; there is no being “almost” a pedophile. Id
^ The belief that pornography is socially contagious, was invented in 1758 by a Swiss doctor, 
Simon Andre Tissot. Money believes it was invented because medicine had no theory to explain 
the social and individual ills of humankind. The belief was that you could degenerate yourself 
by losing moral control of your erotic emotions. Hearings on the Effect of Pornography on 
Women and Children. 98th Cong, at 327.
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Not only is the government unable to prove a link between viewing child pornography 
and an increase in the sexual abuse of children, it is possible that these virtual materials serve to 
diminish the pedophile’s desire to act out against children. Hearings on the Effect of 
Pornography on Women and Children. 98th Cong, at 327. Furthermore, the existing case law 
holds that “unconscious responses” to speech do not outweigh the interest in protecting the First 
Amendment. Hudnut 771 F.2dat330. Suppressing “virtual child” pornography on the basis 
that it may lead to victimization and abuse of children is too questionable a link under First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Burke, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. at 464. Instead of spending money on 
the criminalization of protected speech, society would gain far more by legislating research funds 
directed to discovering the causes and prevention of these types of diseases. ^
iii. The Government’s Own Legislative Justification for the CPPA Shows That
the Luring of Children with This Material Is Insufficient to Validate the
Regulation.
Among the interests presented to uphold the CPPA is the argument that pedophiles may 
use existing child pornography to lure minors into making new child pornography. Osborne. 495 
U.S. at 111 n. 7. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity may be convinced to do so 
by viewing other children having fun participating in the sexual activity. Id. “Virtual child” 
pornography may even be used to blackmail children into submission. Sen. Jud. Comm., Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 1237. 104th Cong. 18 (June 4, 1996).
In the eyes of the government, the pornographic image is the key that unlocks the door 
to the unlawful activity. Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 601. The child 
who views X will do Y. Id Nonetheless, the images in question do not require the participation
^ Senator Biden, a supporter of the CPPA, noted the futile and coimterproductive character of 
enacting a statute of questionable constitutionality. Resources that would otherwise be used 
against pedophiles and child molesters would be diverted to years of litigation as the statute 
works its way through the courts. Sen. Rep. 104-358 at § 8.
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of actual children. Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 601. Illegal activity is 
not necessary at any time during the creation of these materials. Id. Combining these two facts 
creates a flaw in the government’s logic. Images alone do not and cannot lure or seduce 
children to engage in the sexual activity used in the creation of child pornography. Id. at 602. 
The fake images are but “one part of the overall sales pitch of the ... pedophile.” ^
In cases of blackmail, there is a victim, and it can be argued that the nexus between abuse 
and child pornography is stronger than in the case where the explicit material is merely used to 
stimulate the pedophile. Burke, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. at 466 (citations omitted). However, adult 
pornography has been used to lure children in the same manner. Attorney General’s 
Commission on Pornography: Final Report. Atty. Gen. Rep. 405, 686 (1986) (research indicates 
that pedophiles are just as likely to use adult pornography as child pornography to lure children); 
see Osborne, 495 U.S. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging this same fact).
The Eleventh Circuit overlooked the fact that pedophiles use adult pornography to seduce 
minors. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 649. The First Circuit made the same mistake. Hilton. 167 F.3d 
at 67. Tile authors of the Final Repjort of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography 
(“Final Report”), however, acknowledged that it would be insufficient to justify further 
restriction of adult material on the basis that it is used to lure children into performing sexual 
acts. Atty. Gen. Rep. at 411. The Final Report stated that luring of children with piomography
Taken further, it is possible to see that candy. Barbie dolls, and teddy bears can all be used to 
entice young children into engaging in explicit conduct. It is the overall conduct of the 
pedophile that is criminal, not the benign objects used to facilitate the conduct. The Ninth 
Circuit recognized this, acknowledging that while many innocent things can entice children into 
immoral behavior, it does not create, in Congress, the ability to regulate otherwise innocent 
behavior. Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 602. In Hilton, the First 
Circuit accepted the government’s argument that society needed to destroy the “criminal tool” 
used by pedophiles. 167 F.3d at 67. Regrettably, the First Circuit never questioned or addressed 
the issue of whether other innocent items might be used as “tools” to illicit immoral behavior.
Id.
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plays an insignificant role in the overall problem of harm to minors. Atty. Gen. Rep. at 649-650. 
The report concluded that imaginary computer-generated images fell outside the category of 
child pornography. Id. at 405.
To selectively regulate one form of protected speech over another because of a perceived 
evil involves rather precarious reasoning. Gary Geating, Obscenity and Unprotected Speech:
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 13 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 389,400 (1998). Like the production of 
adult pornography, “virtual child” pornography does not require illegal conduct in its creation. 
Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 605. Since such a use has not justified 
the suppression of adult pornography, Stanley. 394 U.S. at 565, it should not be used to justify 
the suppression of child pornography either, Geating, 13 Berkeley Tech. L. J. at 400.
A number of innocent objects and forms of protected speech can entice a child into 
dangerous or injurious behavior. Calvert, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. at 603. 
When only a narrow category of protected images are subjected to CPPA regulation. Congress’ 
true intent becomes apparent. Id. Child pornography has been determined to be an evil in and of 
itself and the luring argument is “barely more than a cloak designed to mask this reality.” Id.
C. The CPPA Does Not Apply the Least Restrictive Means to Further the Government’s 
Articulated Interest.
The state has a compelling interest in eliminating the sexual exploitation of actual 
children used during production, but the means adopted are not narrowly tailored to achieve 
those ends. Since these provisions of the CPPA are not reasonably restrictive, they cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Sable Commun.. 492 U.S. at 126.
In Sable Communications, this Court found prohibition of obscene telephone messages 
constitutional. 492 U.S. at 117. However, this Court held that Communications Act 
amendments prohibiting “indecent” interstate telephone messages far exceeded what was
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necessary to limit access of explicit materials to minors. Sable Commun.. 492 U.S. at 117. This 
Court found the amendments to be insufficiently tailored to protect children because they denied 
adults free speech rights by forcing them to read that which was acceptable for children. Id, at 
127.
In the end, this Court held that legislation passed by Congress must be reasonably 
restricted to the evil with which it is said to remedy. Id, Because the amendments were not 
narrowly tailored to achieve Congressional objectives, the Communications Act amendments 
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id
In Mento, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit’s Hilton decision that the 
“appears to be” languages keeps the pornography industry from hiding behind technological 
advancements. Mento, 231 F.3d at 920-21. “To the viewer, there is no difference between a 
picture of an actual child and what ‘appears to be’ a child.” Id, at 920. As such, both Hilton and 
Mento found the CPPA to be the least restrictive means of ftirthering the protection of minors.
Id, Once again though, the basis of the logic was founded upon third-party reactions. M,
Furthermore, this reasoning used by these circuit courts is inconsistent with the majority 
of cases on point. Sable Commun., 492 U.S. at 126. A number of producers, manufacturers and 
distributors of adult-oriented material are withholding the distribution of their films, books and 
magazines for fear of being punished under the CPPA. (J. A. 18, 21,23.) These same companies 
are forced to withhold from production of certain films and magazine because they contain 
sexually explicit conduct between consenting adults who, to some members of the community, 
appear to be under the age of eighteen. (J.A. 18.) These companies are afraid of being 
prosecuted under the CPPA for mere possession of their own adult material. (J.A. 21.)
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Since these otherwise legal materials would have been produced but for the passage of 
the CPPA, it becomes apparent that the provisions at issue are overinclusive. (J.A. 18.) ‘‘Surely 
this is to bum the house to roast the pig.” Sable Commun., 492 U.S. at 127 (quoting Butler v. 
Mich., 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
III. THE CPPA VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
BECAUSE IT IS OVERLY VAGUE.
The CPPA contains language that is so unclear as to be void for vagueness and 
unconstitutional within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The 
CPPA defines child pornography as any visual depiction, including any photograph, film or 
computer-generated image of sexually explicit conduct where “such visual depiction is, or 
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). The 
CPPA further defines child pornography as any visual depiction that that is “advertised, 
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that 
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”
Id § 2256(8)(C). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that “nor shall any person 
be deprived of life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness without due process.” U.S. Const, amend. 
V. The vague phrases of the CPPA violate due process because a criminal statute must define an 
offense: (I) with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited; and (2) in a manner that does not promote arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 
Knienderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
The CPPA provides that any provision of the Act held to be unconstitutional should be 
severed from the statute, thus allowing the remainder of the constitutional provisions to apply. 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, subsec. 8, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The Free Speech Coalition 
supports eliminating child pornography featuring actual minors. So rather than invalidating the
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Act in its entirety, the phrases “or appears to be” and “conveys the impression” should be 
severed from the statute. In order to stem the tide of actual child pornography, the remainder of 
the statute should remain enforceable.
A. The CPPA^s Definitions of Child Pornography Are Unconstitutionally Vague
Within the Meaning of the Fifth Amendment Because They Promote Arbitrary
and Discriminatory Enforcement.
A criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient definiteness such that it does not 
promote arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Kolenden 461 U.S. at 357. The problem with 
vague laws is that they “impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108-109 (1972).’ The case of Kolender involved a facial challenge to a criminal statute that 
required people loitering or wandering in public areas to provide to police officers a “credible 
and reliable” type of identification upon request. 461 U.S. at 353. The Supreme Court held the 
law void for vagueness, in part because the language provided no indieation of what makes a 
certain type of identification “credible and reliable.” Id at 358. The most significant problem 
with the vague language was that it vested almost complete discretion in law enforcement 
officials to determine if a suspect had met the statutory identification requirements or whether he 
must be detained. Id In its decision, this Court recognized the public policy interest of creating 
criminal statutes that combat the proliferation of crime. Id at 361. However, even such weighty 
public policy interests cannot justify legislation that fails to provide sufficient clarity so as to be 
constitutional. Id. (citing Lanzetta v. N.J.. 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
’ The Court in Gravned determined that an anti-noise ordinance was not impermissibly vague 
because the statute required that punishment was warranted only when there had been a 
demonstrated interference with school activities. 408 U.S. at 109.
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Like the unclear language in Kolender, the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the 
impression” are so vague that they fail to give law enforcement officials any parameters by 
which they should judge suspected offenders. The language is subjective. Furthermore, the 
vague language of the CPPA vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to 
determine whether a suspect has violated the statute. While the proliferation of child 
pornography should be curbed, as this Court stated in Kolender. even weighty public policy 
concerns cannot justify the CPPA’s vague language.
B. The CPPA’s Definitions of Child Pornography Are Unconstitutionally Vague
Because They Fail to Sufficiently Notify Individuals of What Conduct Is
Prohibited.
A criminal statute must define an offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited. E.g. Kolender. 461 U.S. at 357. This Coiul has 
clarified this requirement, stating that a statute must give adequate warning as to what activities 
are prohibited. Broadrick v. Okla.. 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973). In addition, this Court has 
outlined a number of the fundamental principles that vagueness offends, stating that vague 
statutes undermine one’s freedom “to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct.” Gravned.
408 U.S. at 108. Thus, a person of ordinary intelligence must have a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is unlawful, so that he may act in accordance with the law. Id. Otherwise, vague 
laws act as a trap, for they fail to provide adequate warning as to what conduct is prohibited. See 
Royal v. Super. Ct. of N.H.. Rockingham County. 531 F.2d 1084, 1086-1087 (IstCir. 1976) 
(holding petitioner’s arrest under a New Hampshire flag desecration statute unconstitutional 
because the statute’s yagueness failed to proyide, in adyance, a clear standard against which to 
measure guilt). The Court in Broadrick determined that language prohibiting a state employee 
from being “an officer or member” of a “partisan political club” or a candidate for “any paid
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public office” was not void for vagueness because an ordinary person could understand what was 
prohibited. Broadrick. 413 U.S at 607.
Unlike the terms used in the statute at issue in Broadrick. and like the phrases at issue in 
Royal, the CPPA fails to give adequate warning regarding what conduct is prohibited. The 
phrases at issue in Broadrick clearly established who is subject to the statute and exactly what 
actions were prohibited. 413 U.S. at 607. This is not the case with the New Hampshire flag 
desecration law at issue in Royal, which prohibited public “mutilation” of the United States flag. 
531 F.2d at 1085. Like the vague meaning of “mutilation” at issue in Royal, the CPPA’s 
phrasing, which makes illegal the production of sexually explicit material that “appears to be” of 
a minor engaging in sexual activity or “conveys the impression” that a minor was involved in the 
sexually explicit conduct, fails to adequately explain what conduct is prohibited. Indeed, an 
artist or computer programmer cannot know how their visual depictions may appear to others or 
what types of visual images “convey the impression” that the sexual conduct depicted features a 
minor. How is anyone to know what types of visual images “convey the impression” that a 
minor was involved? This court has repeatedly articulated that a person of ordinary intelligence 
should be able to know what conduct is prohibited so that he may avoid detention and 
prosecution; however, phrases such as “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” fail to 
provide adequate warning.
C. TTie CPPA's Vagueness “Cures” are Insufficient.
The Government is certain to argue that the scenario of artists being prosecuted under the 
CPPA is unlikely to occur. The Government bases this argument on the fact that the 
Congressional Record implies that artists will not be targeted. (J.A. 30.) The government 
contends that another potential “cure” to the problem of arbitrary and discriminatory
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enforcement is that the CPPA is designed to prosecute virtual child pornography containing 
images that appear to be of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct which are “virtually 
indistinguishable” from depictions of actual children engaging in the same conduct. The 
problem, however, is that such sentiment is not reflected in the law, and is therefore inapplicable 
to a consideration of the validity of the CPPA. FDA v. Williamson Tobacco Com.. 529 U.S.
120, 132 (2000) (holding that a reviewing court should look to the statute as a whole to resolve 
problems of ambiguity). That is, when law enforcement officials look to the statute to determine 
how to enforce the law, they look at what the statute states, not what the congressional history 
implies.
However, this Court has held that statutes may be interpreted in their statutory and 
historical context and that courts may choose between reasonable available interpretations of 
text. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn., 121 S. Ct. 903, 911 (2001). After reading the legislative 
history, it becomes clear that the CPPA’s constitutionality has always been in doubt. The CPPA 
includes a section that prosecutes people for mailing, distributing, receiving or reproducing 
images that appear to feature an “identifiable minor” engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 
U.S.C. § 2252B(aX5)(b). And the legislative history of the CPPA reveals that Congress included 
this section so that the CPPA would still be applicable in the event that the “appears to be” and 
“conveys the impression” language, as it applies to wholly computer-generated images, is held 
unconstitutional and therefore severed. (J.A. 34.) So even while attempting to define the unclear 
language, the legislative history shows the questionable constitutionality of the CPPA.
In addition, the CPPA also provides an affirmative defense to persons convicted of 
mailing, receiving or distributing, or reproducing child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
The affirmative defense absolves a defendant if he proves that the alleged pornography used
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actual people, the people were adults, and the defendant did not advertise or promote the material 
in such a manner as to convey the impression that the actual adults were minors. 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(c)(l)-(3). The Government may argue that the affirmative defense cures the vagueness 
problem of notice; however, it merely identifies the statute’s flaws. As this Court determined in 
Gravned, the purpose of clear and definite statutes is to apprise the citizenry of what conduct is 
and is not lawful such that a person of ordinary intelligence can act in accordance with those 
laws. 408 U.S. at 108. People have the right to be free from prosecution when they have 
committed no crime. Innocent actors, the government may argue, will be held as such after 
invoking the affirmative defense. But innocent actors should not be subject to court proceedings. 
One point of making vagueness unconstitutional is to require that statutes allow people the 
freedom to know the difference between lawful and unlawful conduct. The CPPA’s affirmative 
defense, though, merely illustrates the statute’s inability to clarify what is legal.
The Government may argue that the problem of the CPPA’s vague language allowing 
subjective and discriminatory enforcement is resolved by the fact that the jury, an objective 
body, has the power to determine for itself whether an image “appears to be” a minor or 
“conveys the impression” that a minor was involved in sexual activity. In addition. Senator 
Biden argues that the possible use of expert witnesses mitigates constitutional concerns because 
the expert can testify as to the physical development of the depicted person, and thus 
demonstrate that the image is a minor. (J.A. 54.) However, neither of these “cures” addresses 
the problem that innocent actors should not be brought into court in the first place. Indeed, the 
CPPA fails to define any standards by which a jury should determine whether an image “appears 
to be a minor” or “conveys the impression” that a minor was involved in sexual activity. These 
definitions and judgments that the jury and expert witnesses may make would need to be known
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by persons before the statute took effect. Only then would the CPPA comport with the 
constitutional ideal that a person of ordinary intelligence should be able to know the law so that 
he may comply with it.
In addition. Senator Biden suggests that the CPPA’s scienter requirement upholds its 
constitutionality. (J.A. 55.) In the past, this Court held that that the scienter requirement in a 
Federal child pornography statute applied to each element of the offense. U.S. v. X-Citement 
Video, 513 U.S. 64, 65 (1994). In X-Citement Video, this Court held that the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant knew that the material was sexually explicit and that the person featured 
was a minor. Id. at 72. Senator Biden argues that a similar standard applied to the CPPA will 
mitigate constitutional concerns.
This scienter requirement, however, only serves to further illustrate the problems with the 
CPPA’s vague language. For it is difficult to imagine how a prosecutor could prove that a 
defendant knomngly mailed, received or reproduced material that ‘‘conveys the impression” to 
others that the material features minors engaging in sexual activity. The scienter requirement 
makes prosecution under the CPPA extremely difficult. Indeed, those artists creating virtual 
images on a computer cannot knowingly create visual depictions that will appear to others as 
images of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, for one cannot know how something will 
appear to others.
Finally, as this Court has articulated, “no one may be required at the peril of life, liberty 
or property to speculate as to the meaning of a penal statute.” Lanzetta. 306 U.S. at 453 (holding 
a statute unconstitutional, in part, because the vague language failed to provide appellants with 
an understanding of what was prohibited). The CPPA is a penal statute; for first offenders, it 
imposes prison terms of up to 15 years. (J.A. 27.) Imposition of a prison term makes the danger
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of vagueness even greater. And the affirmative defense fails to protect those who are found to 
possess child pornography. The affirmative defense applies to those persons who can show that 
the material at issue was produced without the use of real minors, as long as the person did not 
advertise, promote, present, describe or distribute the material so as to convey the impression 
that it contains visual images of minors engaging in sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). 
However, for those defending a charge of simple possession of child pornography, the 
affirmative defense is unavailable. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(A); Mento. 231 F.3d at 917 n. 4. To 
avoid prosecution, a possessor of child pornography must show that he possessed fewer than 
three visual depictions and that he promptly and in good faith destroyed or reported the images to 
police. 18 U.S.C. § 2252B(a)(5)(b); Mento. 231 F.3d at 917 n. 4. An innocent actor possessing 
something as innocuous as three movies, paintings, or sculptures could be found guilty of 
violating the CPPA and subject to a lengthy prison term. In this instance, the affirmative defense 
fails to protect the person doomed to prosecution because of the statute’s vague language. 
Therefore, the phrase “appears to be” in section 2256(8)(B) and all of section 2256(8)(C) should 
be severed from the CPPA.
IV. THE CPPA VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS OVERBROAD.
The CPPA defines child pornography as a visual depiction that is, or appears to be, of a 
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; it also makes illegal child pornography as defined by 
a visual depiction that conveys the impression that the material contains an image of a minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). This language is overbroad because 
it includes within its sweep expressions and conduct that are protected under the First 
Amendment.
Even if a statute is not found to be impermissibly vague, it may still be overbroad if its 
reach prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Gravned, 408 U.S. at 114. Determining if a
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statute is overbroad is measured by whether the law’s prohibitions include behaviors protected 
under the First and Fifth Amendments. Gravned, 408 U.S. at 115. Indeed, as this Court has 
stated in the past, “the First Amendment needs breathing space.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611.
The possibility that overbroad regulations may mute protected speech outweighs the possible 
harm to society of allowing some unprotected speech to be heard. Broadii^, 413 U.S. at 612. 
Moreover, the Broadrick decision states that whatever overbreadth the statute may contain 
should be cured through a case-by-case analysis used to determine when the statute may not 
apply. Id at 615-616. In Gravned, the appellant was arrested for violating an anti-picketing 
statute that prohibited certain picketing near school property while school was in session. 408 
U.S. at 107. Even while finding the statute in question not overbroad, the Court limited the 
applicability of its decision by determining that public sidewalks near school property may not 
be totally off limits to public expression. Id at 118.
Under the rule articulated in Gravned, the CPPA violates the overbreadth doctrine 
because it restricts conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. The anti-picketing statute 
in Gravned was determined not to be overbroad because it only partially restricted First 
Amendment rights. The CPPA’s provisions, in contrast, broadly prohibit an enormous amount 
of material protected under the First Amendment. Where the anti-picketing statute merely acted 
as a time, place, and manner restriction, the CPPA prohibits all manner of expression that 
“appears to be” of a minor or simply “conveys the impression” that a minor was involved in 
sexual activity. This includes not only photography and film, but also computer-generated 
images; that is, the CPPA reaches so far as to make illegal virtual images of fictitious people who 
may appear to be minors, even though such images may depict nothing more than the 
imagination of the artist who made them. Unlike the anti-picketing ordinance in Grayned, the
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CPPA places a total and permanent ban on all forms of sexual expression that may appear to 
feature minors, even if no minors were involved in its production.
According to the rule from Broadrick. the portions of the CPPA in question should be 
severed because they violate the Constitution in that their overbreadth is both real and 
substantial. 413 U.S. at 615. The Oklahoma ordinance at issue in Broadrick was limited to civil 
servants and it merely prohibited them from accepting or soliciting political contributions. Id. at 
603. As noted above, however, the CPPA seeks to prohibit any depiction of sexual imagery that 
may merely convey the impression that a minor was involved. Enforcing the CPPA restricts 
broad categories of permissible expression. It does not merely make illegal pornographic 
material featuring minors; rather, it demonizes all legitimate forms of art and expression that 
may merely convey the impression to someone that a minor was involved, regardless of whether 
any minor was actually involved.
Indeed, as Judith F. Krug, Director of the Office for Intellectual Freedom of the 
American Library Association, testified, the CPPA’s definition of child pornography effectively 
prohibits films such as “Cleopatra,” “Romeo and Juliet,” and “The Last Picture Show.” Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1995 Hearings on S. 1237. 104th Cong, at 42-59. The CPPA 
broadly criminalizes pornography featuring adults who appear to be minors; however, adults 
often portray minors in film, often appearing in the nude and portraying characters engaging in 
sexual activities. As Krug notes, one of the many instances in which a film might be considered 
child pornography is the movie “Cleopatra,” because Elizabeth Taylor, portraying a young girl, 
receive a massage and reveals her buttocks in the film. Id. at 47. Another problem with the 
CPPA’s overbreadth is its criminalization of materials that feature minors who are not real. Id. 
The statute might make unlawful paintings of nonexistent minors; such paintings, including
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depictions of naked cherubs, dominate much of the field of Renaissance art. Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1995 Hearings on S. 1237,104th Cong, at 47. Even Donatello’s sculpture of 
the young “David, ” and Picasso’s “Two Youths,” whose poses and expressions are often 
interpreted as sexual, might very well be considered child pornography under the overly broad 
language of the CPPA. Id. at 48.
The Court in Broadrick also noted that overbreadth may be cured through a case-by-case 
analysis. 413 U.S. at 615-616. However, the problem with such an application of this statute is 
that it requires innocent actors be subject to criminal review. As noted above, an ordinary citizen 
should be able to conform his conduct to the law, and not find himself subject to statutes that 
make illegal broad types of protected expression in the name of easy application. Supra, at § 
III(C).
This Court has further clarified the rules regarding overbreadth, stating that the purpose 
of the doctrine is to safeguard the sensitive nature of protected expression. Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 768. The danger with overbroad statutes is that people may refrain from exercising their 
constitutionally protected rights due to fear of criminal prosecution imder a statute capable of 
applying to protected expression. Id at 768 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env., 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)). In addition, the Court in Ferber suggested that if the 
impermissible application of an overly broad statute amounts to no more than a “tiny fraction of 
materials within the statute’s reach,” the ordinance vrill not be invalidated because of 
overbreadth. 458 U.S. at 773. There, Paul Ferber was convicted under New York’s child 
pornography law for promoting any performance that includes sexual activity by a child under 
sixteen years of age. Id at 751. This Court in Ferber held that the ordinance at issue was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad, using the reasoning articulated in Broadrick to determine that the
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overbreadth was not substantial enough so as to invalidate the New York ordinance. Ferber. 458 
U.S. at 774. The Court decided that the child pornography statute’s legitimate reach outweighed 
the possibility of impermissible application. |d at 773. This decision was partly based on the 
idea that New York had the right to protect against the “harmful employment of children to make 
sexually explicit materials for distribution.” Id. at 771.
In Ferber, this Court stated that one danger of an overbroad statute is the likelihood that it 
may chill constitutionally protected speech. 458 U.S. at 772. Indeed, this danger is real and 
apparent in the CPPA, for it has already achieved such results. In his affidavit, Gary Polao, an 
employee of Outlaw Productions Inc., testified that because of the CPPA his company has 
withheld distribution of legal films containing sexually explicit material featuring adults for fear 
that some of the adults featured may appear to be minors to some members of the public. (J.A.
18.) Such sentiments and fears are highly prevalent throughout the adult pornography market; 
the Free Speech Coalition contains many members who have withheld distribution of protected 
material for fear of being prosecuted because such material may appear to others to contain 
minors. (J.A. 18-23.) The CPPA, then, has already begun to chill constitutionally protected 
speech.
On the surface, it may appear that the facts of Ferber are so closely related to the facts 
here that the question of overbreadth need not be addressed. However, the fact remains that, due 
to differences in the scope of the separate statutes, the CPPA violates the constitution because it 
is overbroad. The statute at issue in Ferber made illegal the promotion and distribution of 
pornography featuring actual children. 458 U.S. at 750-751. In contrast, the CPPA makes illegal 
the production and distribution of any sexual depiction that may appear to be, or convey the 
impression, that a minor was involved. The significant difference in these two statutes is that the
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New York law only prosecutes those guilty of exploiting actual children, whereas the CPPA 
invites a far broader application, allowing the prosecution of those who create virtual images that 
may merely appear to be minors. That is, Ferber was guilty because the books he sold contained 
pictures of real children, whereas members of the Free Speech Coalition may be prosecuted for 
painting, photographing or even creating virtual images of people who merely appear to be 
children.
Such a significant difference is also clear when the Court’s public policy argument in 
Ferber is analyzed in relation to the CPPA. This Court in Ferb_er justified its decision on the 
harm child pornography has on the children featured in its production. 458 U.S. 771. This 
policy does not apply to the CPPA, for the statute at issue here makes illegal expression that fails 
to use minors at all. Moreover, the CPPA makes illegal images of adults who may appear to be 
minors, and even virtual-images that do not use real people; therefore, the policy interests 
articulated in Ferber do not apply here.
Another danger in applying the Ferber reasoning here is that the technology to create 
virtual images did not exist at the time of that decision. This Court has suggested that an 
overbroad ordinance should not be invalidated when the impermissible application amounts to no 
more than a “tiny fraction” of material within the statute’s reach. Id. at 773. But the CPPA’s 
overbroad phrases, which criminalize images that appear to be minors or convey the impression 
that minors were involved in sexual activity, along with advances in technology, have greatly 
expanded what used to be a “tiny fraction” of lawful material. Indeed, the CPPA criminalizes 
materials featuring fictitious children engaged in imaginary sex. Because of advances in 
technology, the CPPA now makes unlavidul an enormous amount of virtual material previously 
protected by the First Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
The Free Speech Coalition recognizes the pernicious nature of child pornography 
produced with actual children. Free Speech understands that a crime has to be committed in 
order to make such pornography. It strongly believes that “actual child” pornography must be 
eliminated. “Actual child” pornography is unprotected speech outside the shelter of the First 
Amendment. Free Speech expects Congress to regulate this type of pornography.
The provisions of the CPPA at issue, however, are a total departure from the existing law. 
In upholding these provisions, we would be stepping off onto a slippery slope. It will become 
increasingly more difficult to prevent this type of speech regulation in other areas of the First 
Amendment doctrine. Adler, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1001 n. 353. Courts are already citing to 
child pornography regulations as a basis of support for far more innocuous restrictions of the
A
freedom of speech. Id.
Free Speech further contends that striking down the disputed provisions of the CPPA will 
not entirely wipe out the regulation of “virtual child” pornography. Computer generated images 
are still subject to the obscenity test under Miller. 413 U.S. at 25. If the government can prove 
that the average person, applying typical community standards, would find that this type of 
virtual image appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, 
political, scientific, or artistic value, then the image would be deemed obscene and thus illegal. 
Id. This will not prevent all child pornography because purely personal creations of the mind 
will still be allowed. It will, however, prevent all foreseeable crime while simultaneously 
upholding the bedrock First Amendment principles by which this Court abides.
The D.C. Circuit relied on child pornography precedent to support its opinion threatening the 
right of newspapers to print truthful information of public importance, when such information 
raises privacy concerns. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463,469 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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